and negative signals (mixed signal group). The paper further indicates that managers' forecast releases also depend on the type of the rm and that managers may try to use the heterogeneity in analysts' treatment. The ndings also suggest that the analysts sometimes fail to adjust for managers' forecast biases and that is why may be misled by managers' forecasts. This provides evidence of inaccuracy on the part of analysts and potential gaming on information disclosures between analysts and managers.
Introduction
The reaction to new information releases in the nancial markets has created intense attention in the literature. The vast literature on this topic shows that investors do not fully incorporate all available information at once (referred to in the literature as overreaction or underreaction), which is evidenced by the existence of return drift of asset returns. The empirical evidence of overreaction and underreaction to new information has motivated researchers to reconsider assumptions of total rationality and homogeneity.
The phenomenon of underreaction or overreaction can be explained at least by three facts. The rst is behavioral, and implies that people just cannot incorporate all relevant information at once, but do this rather with a time lag. Some usual (or expected) event will be perceived as natural and will a prompt the reaction at once, while an unexpected event will be more dicult to interpret, and this may cause either underreaction or overreaction. On the other hand, overreaction may also arise in a situation when investors get the signal of the same sign, because they may be too optimistic or too pessimistic about the information they get.
The second explanation for such a phenomenon can be the technical diculties in putting accurate weights on the information signals that market participants receive simultaneously. As an example of technical or behavioral explanations, we can consider a situation in which the returns are predictable by the set of variables.
In this case, it may be dicult for market participants to extract the information from the several signals which predict dierent future performance paths of the same stock.
The third explanation is the time relevance of the informational signals and inability to predict this relevance. Depending on the macroeconomic conditions some signals may have more predictive power at some point compared to other signals, but under dierent macroeconomic conditions these predictive indicators 3 may have no predictive power at all (Rapach et al. (2010a) , Rapach et al. (2010b) ).
This means that we might be quite sure about the future performance of rms which have only high or only low indicators, while the situation might be not so clear for rms with both positive and negative signals. One might expect that the high or low signal groups may create biases toward optimism or pessimism, while the mixed signal group may prompt more unbiased market perception.
I contribute to the literature on analysts' accuracy by incorporating a nancial signaling approach. In the reference to this approach, it should be mentioned that the managers of rms may or may not try to drive market expectations by choosing or manipulating the nancial indicators. Regardless, these nancial indicators may be perceived by the market agents as informative signals of the future performance of the rms. For these purposes, I consider three main groups of nancial indicators which are indicators of protability, operating eciency, and capital structure.
As the second stage in my paper, I analyze the responses of managers to analysts'
forecast accuracies or inaccuracies. If the analysts treat rms with low, high and mixed signals dierently, we might expect that the managers would adjust their own forecasts in order to correct or, maybe, exploit the biases. While previous research considers the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the managers' forecast activity (Mikhail et al. 2009; Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008) , I consider the managers' forecast releases from the standpoint of their response to the perception of analysts and the impact of managers' forecasts on the analysts.
By examining the analysts' earnings forecast revisions in the response to the managers' forecast announcements, we may gain insights into whether and how the analysts are inuenced by the managers' forecasts. If the managers really release their forecasts strategically, the analysts may foresee such strategic behavior and revise their forecasts, adjusting for the possible forecast biases of managers depending on the types of the rms. The evidence of the heterogeneity of managers' forecast behavior and the analysts' forecast revisions in response, depending on the type of 4 the rms could imply that there is a forecast disclosure game between analysts and managers.
Overall, the ndings of the paper show, that the analysts' forecast errors distributions dier across low, high, and mixed signal groups. The impact of the momentum and reversal in the earnings change on the analysts' forecast errors is not equal across low, high and mixed signal groups. There is also evidence of heterogeneity in managers' forecast errors depending on the signal group of the rm and analysts' failure to adjust the earnings forecast revisions for the managers' biases.
While the previous research shows that the key indicators of balance sheet can predict future performance of rms, I show that it is not separate variables but rather their combination play a role in creating forecast biases of market participant including analysts and managers. In contrast to the previous literature, which shows the usefulness of the balance sheet as the source of information, I contribute to the existing literature by showing that balance sheet information may also create inefciencies on the part of analysts and managers trying to exploit such ineciencies.
The ndings of this paper may also motivate future research to identify the hierarchical structure of key nanical ratios predicting future earnings of rms, which may improve nancial statement analysis and equity valuation practices.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section the existing literature is discussed. The model and methodology are described in the third section. The fourth section addresses the issue of data and the sample selection. The fth and sixth sections present the main ndings. The seventh and the last section concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
There is a range of literature which aims to explain the analysts' forecast inaccuracy 1 . Another area of research concentrates more on the asymmetries of market perception. Bagchee (2009) , for example, nds asymmetry in the reaction of investors based on the performance of IPO of rms. If the rms upgrade, the investors react to new information faster, while if the rms downgrade they adjust their expectations approximately 3 times more slowly than after a positive signal. Larson and Mandura (2003) nd that the reaction to the new information will be dierent depending on whether the information concerns losers (those stocks that have recently performed poorly) or winners (those stocks that perform well). They nd that while losers experience underreaction from the market participants to the information, winners, on the contrary, are more likely to experience overreaction.
These ndings suggest that investors tend to act not only based on the information they get but also on their own judgments and beliefs. This means that not only does the information matters, but the history of the stocks also plays a role.
Moreover, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) nd that analysts underreact more when there are earning announcements by other rms, which is explained by attention distraction: the more information there is, the more dicult it may be to process it.
In comparison, I expect that it will be more dicult to process information about the same rm if it gives multidirectional signals. The diculties in interpreting signals may be also noticed by the reaction of the market to the sequence of signals.
If investors observe signals of the same sign several periods in a sequence, they may perceive it as a pattern and overreact, while after receiving signals of dierent signs, investors underreact, not knowing how to interpret contradictory signals (Potesman, 2001; Kaestner, 2006) . While previous studies consider the time dimension for the sequence of news, it may be of interest to see the reaction to signals which are 1 Among them are the works of Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) , Mikhail et al. (2003), De Bondt and Thaler (1990) , Benou (2003) , Constantimou et al (2003) , etc. sent simultaneously. For cases, when rms send only signals of the same sign, every subsequent signal will conrm a previous one. This may lead to the correct interpretation of the information or it may cause overreaction, while the signals of dierent signs may raise diculties in interpreting their mutual eect and lead to underreaction.
When creating their forecasts, analysts make extensive use of all available information. Frankel and Lee (1998) , for example, show that rms with particular characteristics such as higher past sales growth and higher market-to-book ratios receive higher optimistic forecasts by analysts. At the same time, Drake et al. (2011) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that information from accounting statements can give the direction of short interest as well as analysts' recommendation adjustments. It is also commonly accepted that no particular nancial ratio is informative unless it is considered as a part of the more complicated set of signals. This happens because the relative level of indicators rather than absolute value and/ or their combinations are informative. For example, small changes in leverage can imply adjustments to the optimal level, while dividend reductions can be perceived as new investments opportunities (and as a result future growth) or as an indicator of poor performance and a need for additional cash inows. Small changes in sales and inventory can be the result of demand uctuations, but are not necessarily informative about eciency trends. It is this complexity of nancial ratios that can explain the motivation to use the score or the sign of the ratios rather than the relative or absolute values of nancial ratios used by Drake et al. (2011) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) , who show that stock returns can be predicted by the sign of nancial ratios and that they are correlated with the score constructed from the sum of the signs.
The other motivation for using the score can be evidence that the combination of forecasts made on dierent variables is more accurate than those based on a particular variable (Rapach et al., 2010a) . It has been shown that the simple models in which a set of regressions is used and returns in each regression are regressed on 7 one explanatory variable and then the expected returns are calculated as equally weighted average of the predicted returns taken from this set of regressions work better than more elaborated models (Rapach et al. , 2010a) . The underlying idea of their model is not the inclusion of all the variables into one regression, similar to Welch and Goyal (2008) , but that the combination forecast of the returns is the weighted average of all the forecasts made by each variable separately. The intuition behind the better performance of forecast combinations is explained by the fact that individual specic variables fail to capture macroeconomic uctuations, while the use of only macroeconomic variables does not take into account the specic economic performance and opportunities of rms, but the combination of both specications delivers a synergic eect.
In addition to the intrinsic value of rms, the analysts' forecasts are inuenced by market expectations (Mikhail et al., 2009; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) . While a range of authors establish the impact of market expectations on forecast accuracy and the fact that accuracy is the lowest during times when optimism is not explained by fundamental values (Mikhail et al., 2009 ), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) show that managers drive the analysts' forecasts upwards or downwards during periods of optimistic and pessimistic market expectations respectively. The authors explain this phenomenon by noting the fact that during low market expectations, the managers want to keep investors optimistic about the future of their rms, while during high market expectations they want rms to remain a bit undervalued. The authors also argue that the choice of managers to drive analysts' forecast is strategic, but it would be also natural to suspect that their strategic behavior is predetermined not only by the market expectations but also by the expected future prospects of rms and the uncertainty of these prospects (or in other words by the nancial ratios and their combinations).
If the choice of managers to walk the forecasts up or down the forecasts is really strategic, the market (and especially such sophisticated players as analysts) may treat the disclosures of managers dierently, since they may anticipate dierent reliability or implications of these forecasts depending on the types of rms. Managers of low signal rms may have much less incentives to drive the market expectation down even during optimistic periods, while the managers of high signal rms can aord to drive the analysts' forecasts downwards even during pessimistic periods.
The literature on the strategic forecast releases by managers shows that managers will avoid disclosure if they expect to achieve higher trading prots under the condition of non-disclosure, but at the same time they may disclose more actively under circumstances of higher volatility of earnings surprises and higher probability of liquidity shocks (Ma and Chang, 2007) . Other documented reasons for disclosure decisions of managers include reputation eect, maintenance of stock prices, building of credibility, and conveying potential growth opportunities (Graham et. al., 2005) . Dobler (2008) , on the contrary shows, that the value of managers' forecasts should not be overestimated, since government regulation cannot impose a veriability mechanism on the disclosure practices of managers.
In contrast, in my paper I concentrate on ways the nancial characteristics of a company and analysts' perception of a rm can motivate managers to release their forecasts. In the disclosure games, dierent types of agents will behave in dierent ways. This may happen because by following the analysts, the managers may identify their biases and try to exploit any ineciency. If I nd evidence that managers' forecast activity is strategic, it might be interesting to study how analysts respond to such strategic behavior on the part of managers. By behaving strategically, managers try to drive the market in general, and the analysts in particular. One might expect that such strategic forecast releases may fail, because analysts may foresee the incentives for managers to manipulate the forecasts. 9 3
Methodology
In reference to the accuracy of analysts' forecast, usually in the literature, regressions for estimating analysts' underreaction to earnings announcements (running forecast errors on previous period earnings changes) include only earnings changes, returns, lagged forecast errors, number of rms followed by analysts, and analysts' experience, brokerage size, forecast age, and forecast frequency. In fact, rms may give multidirectional and more complicated signals (referring to signals I mean key nancial indicators): some may be positive and others negative simultaneously. This implies that correct interpretation of these signals separately without taking into account the rest may be a dicult task. Consider the following situation. Suppose that rm's earnings increased in the last quarter, but at the same time the leverage of the rm also increased in the same time period. On the one hand, the increase in the earnings may imply a momentum in the earnings, on the other, the higher leverage may also signal a future decrease of prots due to increased liabilities or that the increase of the leverage is the result of government quantitative easing policy. A small increase in the leverage may still be considered a positive signal if the leverage of a rm compared to the leverage of the rms in the same industry is low. Moreover, the change in leverage may be the result of the adjustments to the optimal level. Such adjustments may imply additional costs, resulting from such adjustments (Fischer et al., 1989) , but rms deviating from optimal leverage ratio incur losses (Ju et al., 2002) .
Small dividend policy changes can also be misleading. The dividends reductions can be considered a signal of investment and potential growth (Décamps & Villeneuve, 2005) or an excess need for cash and poor performance. These ndings are also supported by Simpson et al. (2009) , who nd evidence of overreaction hypotheses, uncertain hypotheses, overoptimism, and market eciency after dividend announcements. Changes in inventory and sales can be the result of demand uctu-ations rather than indicators of a rm's operating eciency. That is why I cannot consider absolute changes but will rather consider the relative rates. In addition, I
will not address the issue of the impact of separate variables, but rather how their combinations change the informational set.
The idea is to divide the sample into sub-samples according to the combination of positive and negative signals. protability, operating eciency, and capital structure 3 . The protability ratios include sales prot margin (SPM), eective tax rate (ETR), interests to debt ratio (INTD), and dividends-to-earnings (DE) ratio. The operating eciency ratios include asset turnover (TURNA), total accruals (TOTACR), capital expenditure (CAPEXP), correlation between costs and revenues (CCR), assets growth (AG), and depreciation-to-assets ratio (DA). The capital structure measures include book value to assets ratio (BVA), market-to-book value (BM), leverage (L), common stock 2 For more details on the informativeness of nancial signals for the portfolio performance, see Piotroski (2001) , Jegadeesh (2004) , Nguyen (2005) , and Drake et al (2011) . 3 The set of signals include those variables which were found to be signicant for earnings predictability by previous research (Nissim & Penman, 2001; Dichev & Tang, 2009; Faireld et al., 1996; Ou, 1990; Foster, 1977) . The details of constructing all the variables are provided in Table  1. 11 interest (CSI), and minority stock interest (MSI) 4 .
Since the values of these variables may dier across industries, the score is assigned relative to the percentile level of a particular variable in the industry, where industries were determined by the 2-digit Standard Industry Classication Code.
The appropriate score is given according to whether the indicator of the rm is below the 35th percentile in the industry, between the 35th and 65th percentile, or is above the 65th percentile. Since for such variables as SPM, TURNA, DE, TOTACR, CAPEXP, ETR, INTD, AG, and CSI, the higher the value of these indicators, the more ecient the rm is, the score for each of these variables is 0, 1, or 2 for the Table 1 ; the estimates are provided in Table 2 ).
To draw a conclusion, I need only three main groups: those rms with a high (2011) and construct a total score, which equals the sum of the signals. Those rms with a total score below the 25th percentile were considered to be the low signal group, rms with a total score above the 75th percentile were termed the high signal group, and those with a total 4 The estimation model also includes such variables as lag of earnings per share and size of the rms, but I consider these variables as the state variable and do not take them into account when constructing the score of signals.
5 There were missing values in the data for some of the nancial indicators. For the missing values, the score 1 was assigned since it is considered to be neutral (neither positive, nor negative).
score within the bounds of 45th and 55th percentile -the mixed signal group 6 .
As the rst step, I use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in order to test the equality of distributions of the analysts' forecast errors for dierent types of rms, specically, those with only relatively strong nancial indicators, with only relatively weak nancial indicators, and those with both strong and weak simultaneously.
All models used in the analysis are nested in the following general form specication 7 : In the model of of forecast accuracy of analysts, vector Y represents the vector of 6 Another approach to forming the groups was also considered: to form the low signal group only with high number of low signals, some neutral signals and no high signals; for the high signal group to include only rms with high number of high signals, some neutral signals and no low signals; and to construct the mixed signal groups of rms with both high numbers of both positive and negative signals. This approach may be in line with the research question, but could also lead to my working with very specic types of rms. On the contrary, although one may argue that following the approach I used, the low signal group may include a couple of high signals, and high signal group may include a few low signals, this approach nevertheless seems more plausible, since rms with even one or two negative (low) signals on the background of, say, 5 positive (high) signals will be perceived as rather nancially strong and stable. The same argument can be applied to the low and mixed signal groups. 7 All the estimation equations with the variable construction description are provided in the appendix, Table 1 . To test the impact of signal combination, I also include the standard deviation of the scores (those scores which I use in order to group the rms into sub samples of low, mixed and high signal groups). To test the aect of analysts' heterogeneity on the managers' incentives to release forecasts, I construct the variable of analysts' bias. For this purposes, I run model 1 of the accuracy of analysts' forecasts, save the explained and residual parts, and average them over analysts for a rm. While the predictable part should take into account the rational portion of analysts' forecast errors, the residual part should contain the irrational bias. This is because if the error term from model 1 is represented by:
where b i,j,t is the bias of analyst i for rm j in period t, and i,j,t is the error term with zero mean and constant variance. Then averaging η i,j,t over analysts for a particular rm i results inη j,t =b j,t or, in other words, in the average bias for the rm.
To test the hypothesis that analysts discount managers' forecasts and that their discount factor will depend on the type of the rm, I use the robust least squared estimator for equation (1), but here Y is the vector of analysts' adjustment and the estimation equation includes X, Z, and M as matrices of explanatory variables.
As the response to the managers' forecasts, I consider only those analysts' forecasts which were releases within 5 days after the managers' forecasts. I restrict the analysts' forecast revisions to 5 a days window because later revisions are likely to be driven either by new information on the market, or as the result of analyst herding behavior in response to other analysts' revisions, or both. From the set of the explanatory variables of analysts' adjustments, managers' forecasts, managers' forecast range, ex-post managers' forecast errors, total signal score, and standard deviation of signals are of primary interest. Among the other rm's specic variables are the average stock returns and standard deviation of trading volume over 10 days prior to the analyst's forecast revision date, the average abnormal volume over 10 days prior to the analyst's forecast revision date, the average bid-ask spread and the standard deviation of bid-ask spread over 10 days prior to the analyst's forecast revision date, the standard deviation of price over the last 120 days prior to the analyst's forecast revision date, dummy variable of loss in the previous quarter, dummy variable of negative managers' forecasts, dummy variable of bad news provided by managers' forecast, interaction term of dummy of bad forecast and forecast news, • rms with mixed signals versus all the rest of the rms;
• rms with mixed signals versus rms with low signals;
• rms with mixed signals versus rms with high signals;
• rms with low signals versus rms with high signals.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distributions of forecast errors are not the same for each of the above subgroups. The comparison of measures of the distributions from Table 3 indicates that the mean forecast error in absolute value is the highest for the high signal group and almost the same for the low and mixed signal groups. In level terms, the mean is the lowest for the low and mixed signal groups and the highest for the high signal group. This implies that the analysts tend to overestimate future performance the most for the high signal group • rms without changes versus those with changes in the signals;
• rms without changes versus those with only negative changes;
• rms without changes versus those with only positive changes;
• rms with positive changes versus those with negative changes.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that these subgroups do not have the same distribution functions. From Table 3 , we may see that the mean forecast error for the subgroup which had changes in the signals is even more negative than that for rms which had no changes. The standard deviation, as expected, is higher for the subgroups with changes in the signals. The forecast errors are also more skewed to the left, but kurtosis is smaller for rms which did not have changes in the signals compared to rms which had some changes. Comparing the groups with only negative changes versus positive changes, the mean forecast error for the subgroup with only negative changes is more negative and the standard deviation is higher for this subgroup. The subgroup with only negative changes is less skewed to the left and has lower kurtosis.
The eect of asymmetry of signal changes across groups: positive versus negative changes • no positive changes and a high number of negative changes versus the rest of the sample;
• an equal number of positive and negative changes versus the rest of the sample;
• a high number of positive changes and no negative changes versus no positive changes and a high number of negative changes;
• a high number of positive changes and no negative changes versus those with an equal number of positive and negative changes;
• no positive changes and a high number of negative changes versus those with an equal number of positive and negative changes.
Again, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that these subgroups do not have the same distribution functions. The mean forecast error (Table 3) is the smallest for the subgroup with a high number of negative changes in the signals, and the highest for rms with a high number of positive changes. In the absolute terms, the mean forecast error is highest for the subgroups with a high number of the negative changes in the signals, which implies that the analysts underreact the most to negative changes in the balance sheet of the rms. We can also see that the standard deviation in the forecast errors is highest for rms which had a high number Are analysts' perception of earnings the same across groups?
The estimation results of the analysts' forecast accuracy model are presented in Table 4 . Here the estimates next to variables including the total score, standard deviation of scores, momentum and reversal in the earnings changes are of the primary interest. From the regression for the whole sample, I nd that the estimates of the total score and standard deviation of score are both signicant and negative.
Comparing the estimates across low, mixed and high signal groups, I nd that the estimates on the total score are signicant and negative for the low signal group, but insignicant for the mixed and high signal groups. So ceteris paribus, the analysts produce more accurate forecasts for the low signal group when they observe an increase in signals, while the same increase in signals for the mixed or high signal group does not aect the precision of their forecasts. The estimates of the standard deviation of the total score is signicant for the low and mixed signal groups only, being positive for the low signal groups and negative for the mixed signal group.
The estimates of momentum of earnings change were found to be signicant for all groups, but I cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal across groups. As for the reversal in earnings, it leads to higher analysts' inaccuracy in the analysts' forecasts for the low and high signal groups, but the estimate is insignicant for the mixed signal group.
Do managers' forecast biases dier across groups?
Tables 5 provides the estimates of managers' forecast error model (model 3).
There are 5 main estimates of primary interest: total score, the standard deviation of scores, standard deviation of analysts' forecasts, analysts' bias, and predicted analysts' forecast error. All of these variables have dierent eects on the forecast releases of managers of dierent types of rms (all of the estimates except for the predicted part of analysts' forecast error were found to dier across groups).
Recalling that the managers' forecast error was dened as the dierence between the actual level and the managers' forecast scaled by mean price, one might observe that the managers of the mixed signal groups tend to overestimate the earnings per shares with an increase in the score, while they underestimate earnings for the high signal group with an increase in the total score. The total score was not found to be signicant for the low signal group.
The standard deviation of the scores should reveal the impact of the uncertainty associated with the future performance of the rm. Here I also nd asymmetry in the managers' forecasts between managers of the low, mixed and high signal groups: managers tend to overestimate the future earnings per share with the increase in the heterogeneity of the signal for the low and high signal groups; the overestimation is higher for the high signal group. On the contrary, the managers of the mixed signal group underestimate future earnings with an increase in the uncertainty of the directions of the signals.
The increase in the standard deviation of the analysts' forecast errors does not aect the precision of the forecasts generated by managers of the low signal group, but it leads to overestimated forecasts for the mixed and high signal groups, with more optimistic forecasts for the high signal group.
The managers of the high signal group are inuenced by the forecast bias of analysts and they tend to overestimate their forecasts when they observe higher analysts' forecast bias. The estimates of analysts' forecast bias for the low and mixed signal groups were not found to be signicant.
With the increase in the predictable part of analysts' forecasts, the managers of the low and mixed signal groups tend to overestimate the future earnings per share and the estimates were not found to be dierent across groups. Do the analysts' discount the managers' forecasts? Tables 6 and 7 Upon managers' forecasts, the analysts update their forecasts upwards for all signal groups with the increase in the managers' earnings estimates. The estimates were not found to dierentiate across dierent groups. The increase in the managers' forecasts was not found to be signicant in the probability model of greater analysts' forecast errors after revision for any of the groups. Basically, the analysts' optimally extract the information from the managers' forecasts across groups.
When the managers provide upper and lower bounds of their forecasts, the analysts tend to revise their forecast upwards for the high and mixed signal groups.
However, the managers' forecast range does not aect the probability of greater analysts' forecast errors after revision for the low signal groups. For the mixed and high signal groups, an increase in the managers' forecast range leads to higher probability of more signicant analysts' forecast errors after the revision and this eect is greater for the mixed signal group. This suggests that the analysts tend to extract the information from the managers' forecast range optimally for the low signal group, but they may not be able to do this for the mixed and high signal groups.
If the managers release a point estimate and only lower bound for their forecast of future earnings per share, the analysts' revisions for the high signal group are not inuenced by the dierences in the earnings estimates and the lower bound of the earnings estimates. For the low and mixed signal group, they tend to revise upwards and the estimates were not found to be dierent for these two signal groups. For the low and mixed signal groups, the analysts forecast accuracy after revision is not aected by the managers' forecast range if managers provide only the earnings estimate and the lower bound of estimate, but the probability of the greater analysts' forecast after revision is smaller for the high signal group.
With the increase in the ex-post managers' forecast errors, the analysts tend to revise upwards and the estimates are equal across groups. On the contrary, the probability of having a higher forecast error after the revision increases in the expost managers' forecast errors for all the groups. While eect of the increase is the highest for the mixed signal group, it does not dier across low and high signal groups.
The increase in the total signal score leads to the upwards revision of analysts' forecasts for the low signal group and has no eect on revisions of the mixed and high signal groups. The probability of having the higher forecast error after revision is not inuenced by the increase in the total signal score across the signal groups.
The increase in the heterogeneity of the signals leads analysts to revise downwards for the low signal group and upwards for the high signal groups. The revisions for the mixed signal group are not aected by an increase in the heterogeneity in signals. As for the precisions of the analysts' forecasts after revision, the probability of having higher forecast errors is not aected by the increase in the heterogeneity in signals for any of the groups. done by using comp_ibes_crsp_fc_tr_090413 EP S j,t = ρ 0 + ρ 1 EP S j,t−1 + ρ 2 SP M j,t−1 + ρ 3 T U RN A j,t−1 + ρ 4 BV A j,t−1 + +ρ 5 BM j,t−1 + ρ 6 L j,t−1 + ρ 7 DE j,t−1 + ρ 8 T OT ACR j,t−1 + ρ 9 CAP EXP j,t−1 + +ρ 10 SIZE + ρ 11 ET R j,t−1 + ρ 11 CCR j,t−1 + ρ 13 IN T D j,t−1 + (2) +ρ 14 AG j,t−1 + ρ 15 CSI j,t−1 + ρ 16 DA j,t−1 + ρ 17 M SI j,t−1 + ς j,t
Variables Description

EP S j,t
The earnings per share excluding extraordinary items in the quarter, where j stands for rm j and t (t − 1) for quarter t
The sales prot margin is equal to operating income after depreciation to sales
The asset turnover is calculated as current sales divided by total assets BV A j,t−1 Book value, which is dierence between total assets and total liabilities, scaled by total assets
The market-to-book value equals to book value divided by the product of the average number of shares outstanding over the last quarter and the average share price over the last quarter
The leverage is the ratio of sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets
The dividends-to-earnings ratio equals dividends divided by earnings T OT ACR j,t−1 Total accruals are calculated as the change in the total assets minus the change in total liabilities and minus the change in the yearly average cash scaled by total assets CAP EXP j,t−1 Capital expenditures are the ratio of yearly capital expenditures to total assets SIZE j,t−1 Natural logarithm of total assets ET R j,t−1 Eective tax rate is calculated as one year moving average income taxes to pretax income ratio
The correlation between costs and revenues over the last four quarters
IN T D j,t−1
Interests to debt ratio is calculated as the ratio of interests to the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities
Assets growth is equal to logarithm of total assets in the current quarter to total assets in the previous quarter
The common stock interest equals to income before extraordinary items available to common stock holders to common stockholder equity 
The depreciation-to-assets ratio is the depreciation scaled by total assets
The minority stock interest calculated as the ratio of noncontrolling interests to common stockholder equity Model 2: Analyst inaccuracy F cErr i,j,t = α 0 + α 1 F cErr i,j,t−1 + α 2 BrSize i,t + α 3 F cAge i,j,t + +α 4 F cF r i,j,t + α 5 GenExp i,t + α 6 F irmExp i,j,t + α 7 N umF irm i,t + +α 8 M omEarn j,t + α 9 RevEarn j,t + α 10 T otScore j,t + α 11 sdT otScore j,t + (3)
Analyst's characteristics
The forecast error of analyst i for rm j in quartet t and it is equal to the absolute value of the last forecast error of analyst i for rm j in quarter t by the end of the scal quarter multiplied by 100; the forecast error is dened as the dierence between the forecasted level and actual earnings per share scaled by the by the mean stock price over 10 days before the day of forecast announcement
10
BrSize i,t
The indicator variable of the brokerage house size for the the analyst i is employed in quarter t and it equls 1 if the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house is above 10-th decile and 0 otherwise.
F cAge i,j,t
The forecast age or the time interval between the forecast release date of analyst i for rm j and the earnings announcement date F cF r i,j,t
The forecast frequency or the number of quarterly forecasts analyst i released for rm j in the previous calendar year GenExp i,t
The number of quarters for which analyst i released at least one quarterly forecast prior to the release of the current forecast ____________ 12 If the day of the week 10 days before the forecast announcement is Saturday or Sunday, I take the price 11 days or 9 days before the forecast respectively.
32 
The number of quarters for which analyst i released at least one quarterly forecast for rm j prior to the release of the current forecast N umF irm i,t
The number of rms followed in the same 2-digit SIC industry Firm's characteristics
The momentum of the previous period earnings change, which is equal to the change in the earnings between t − 2 and t − 1 if the change is of the same sign as the change in the current period, between time interval t − 1 and t, and 0 otherwise RevEarn j,t
The reversal of the previous period earnings change, which is equal to the change in the earnings between t − 2 and t − 1 if the change is of the opposite sign as the change in the current period, in a time interval between t − 1 and t, and 0 otherwise;
T otScore j,t
The sum of scaled signals sdT otScore j,t
Standard deviation of signals
Macroeconomic conditions M anF cErr j,t = β 0 + β 1 sdSc j,t + β 2 sdAnF c j,t + β 3 AnBias j,t + +β 4 AnF cErrP red j,t + β 5 F undSent t + β 6 ResSent t + β 7 Ret j,t + +β 8 sdRet j,t + β 9 V ol j,t + β 10 sdV ol j,t + β 11 AbnV ol j,t + β 12 AbnRet j,t + (4) +β 13 sdAbnRet j,t + β 14 BASpr j,t + β 15 sdBASpr j,t + β 16 sdP rc j,t +β 17 InsT rans j,t + β 18 dLoss j,t + β 19 dLossF c j,t + +β 20 dBadN ews * N ews j,t +β 21 F cHor j,t + β 22 IndConc j,t + β 23 Size j,t + ω j,t AnBias j,t
The residual part from model 3, averaged over analysts for rm j in period t. AnF cErrP red j,t The explained part from model 3, averaged over analysts for rm j in period t. Ret j,t
The return for holding the stock of rm j in quarter t for the 10 days window prior the managers' forecast announcement date (capital gain on the stock)
The standard deviation of the holding return for the rm's j stock in quarter t during the 10 day window prior to the managers' forecast announcement date
The average ratio of stock trading volume to the number of shares outstanding of rm j in quarter t over the 10 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement date sdV ol j,t
The standard deviation of the ratio of stock trading volume to the number of shares outstanding of rm j in quarter t over the 10 days window before the managers' forecast announcement date
AbnV ol j,t The average abnormal trading volume for rm j in quarter t over 10 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement BASpr j,t The average bid-ask spread for the stock of rm j in quarter t over 10 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement sdBASpr j,t
The standard deviation of bid-ask spread for the stock of rm j in quarter t over 10 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement sdP rc j,t The standard deviation of stock price of rm j in quarter t over 120 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement sdP rc j,t The standard deviation of stock price of rm j in quarter t over 120 days window prior to the managers' forecast announcement InsT rans j,t The value of insiders transactions of rm's j securities over 10 days prior to the managers' forecast announcement date which is equal the sum of purchases minus sales. The dummy variable of negative forecast which is equal 1, if the rm's j managers' forecast is negative, and 0 otherwise dBadN ews * N ews j,t
The interaction term of dummy variable of bad news and forecast news for rm j in quarter t F cHor j,t
The time interval between the managers' forecast release day and and of the scal quarter for rm j in quarter t IndConc j,t
The industry concentration of sales measured by the herndahl index for rm j in quarter t Size j,t
The size of rm j in quarter t which is equal natural logarithm of total assets
Model 4: Analysts' adjustment AnAdj i,j,t = δ 0 + δ 1 M anF c j,t + δ 2 M anF cRan j,t + δ 3 M anF cRanLow j,t + +δ 4 M anErr j,t + δ 5 T otScore j,t + δ 6 sdSc j,t + δ 7 sdAnF c j,t + δ 8 F undSent t + +δ 9 ResSent t + δ 10 Ret j,t + δ 11 sdRet j,t + δ 12 V ol j,t + δ 13 sdV ol j,t + + +δ 14 AbnV ol j,t + δ 15 BASpr j,t + δ 16 sdBASpr j,t + δ 17 sdP rc j,t + (5) +δ 18 InsT rans j,t + δ 19 dLoss j,t + δ 20 dLossF c j,t + δ 21 dBadN ews j,t + +δ 22 dBadN ews * N ews j,t + δ 23 F cHor j,t + δ 24 IndConc j,t + δ 25 Size j,t +δ 26 Bold i,j,t + δ 27 F cAge i,j,t + δ 28 F cF r i,j,t + δ 29 F irmExp i,j,t + ε i,j,t
Variable Description
AnAdj i,j,t The ordered outcome of analyst's i adjustment of his forecast for rm j in quarter t; the adjustment, in its turn, is equal to the dierence between new forecast and the old one;
M anF c j,t The managers' forecast of rm j in quarter t M anF cRan j,t AnAccRev i,j,t = γ 0 + γ 1 M anF c j,t + γ 2 M anF cRan j,t + γ 3 M anF cRanLow j,t + +γ 4 M anErr j,t + γ 5 T otScore + γ 6 sdSc j,t + γ 7 sdAnF c j,t + γ 8 F undSent t + +γ 9 ResSent t + γ 10 Ret j,t + γ 11 sdRet j,t + γ 12 V ol j,t + +γ 13 sdV ol j,t +γ 14 AbnV ol j,t + γ 15 BASpr j,t + +γ 16 sdBASpr j,t + γ 17 sdP rc j,t + (6) +γ 18 InsT rans j,t + +γ 19 dLoss j,t + γ 20 dLossF c j,t + γ 21 dBadN ews j,t + +γ 22 dBadN ews * N ews j,t + γ 23 F cHor j,t + γ 24 IndConc j,t + γ 25 Size j,t + +γ 26 Bold i,j,t + γ 27 F cAge i,j,t + γ 28 F cF r i,j,t + γ 29 F irmExp i,j,t + i,j,t
AnAccRev i,j,t
The dummy variable which equals 1 if the absolute value of analyst's i forecast for rm j after revision is bigger than the one before revision and 0 otherwise 
